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Abstract
This paper shows a New Keynesian model where wages are set at the value that
matches households labor supply with rms labor demand. Subsequently, wage
stickiness brings industry-level unemployment uctuations. After aggregation, the
rate of wage ination is negatively related to unemployment, as in the original Phillips
(1958) curve, with an additional term that provides forward-looking dynamics. The
supply-side of the model can be captured with dynamic expressions equivalent to
those obtained in Erceg, Henderson, and Levin (2000), though with di¤erent slope
coe¢ cients. Impulse-response functions from a technology shock illustrate the inter-
actions between sticky prices, sticky wages and unemployment.
Keywords: New Keynesian model, sticky wages, unemployment.
JEL codes: E12, E24, E32, J30.
1 Introduction
The introduction of nominal rigidities in microfounded models (so-called New Keynesian
models) brought enormous consequences for Macroeconomics, in general, and Monetary
Economics, in particular. At rst, nominal frictions lead to short-run real e¤ects from
demand-side shocks breaking down the classical dichotomy between nominal and real vari-
ables that was present in Neoclassical models (Fischer, 1977; Taylor, 1979; and Blanchard
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and Fischer, 1989, chapter 8). A second wave of papers (Hairault and Portier, 1993; Yun,
1996) showed how incorporating price stickiness is key to replicate, in a realistic fashion,
the business-cycle responses of ination and output to technology and monetary shocks.
Moreover, New Keynesian models predict that the level of employment (total hours) falls
after an expansionary technology shock as empirically supported by Galí (1999) and Francis
and Ramey (2005).1 Last but not least, New Keynesian models have become the work-
ing instrument for much of the latest monetary policy analysis due to both its theoretical
appeal, as they overcome the Lucas (1976) critique, and its empirical plausibility. Two
widely-used books on Monetary Economics, recently published, that rely the analysis upon
the New Keynesian framework are Walsh (2003), and Woodford (2003).
However, todays New Keynesian framework is little Keynesian in one particular sense.
It is commonly presented as a General Equilibrium model that ignores the presence of
unemployment in the labor market.2 This fails to comply with both the original Keynesian
analysis of the labor market (Keynes, 1936, chapters 18-20), and also deviates from the
actual functioning of labor market in developed economies where we observe unemployment
uctuations.3
The inuential paper by Erceg, Henderson and Levin (2000), henceforth EHL, brought
a follow-up of New Keynesian papers with sticky wages in addition to sticky prices. Repre-
sentative examples among these papers are Amato and Laubach (2003), Smets andWouters
(2003, 2007), and Christiano et al. (2005). With a somehow di¤erent labor market struc-
ture, this paper describes a New Keynesian model with sticky prices, sticky wages, and
also unemployment. I voluntarily stress the word "also" because the New Keynesian lit-
erature that I just cited incorporate wage setting rigidities that, somehow surprisingly, do
not deliver unemployment situations. By contrast, this paper shows how sticky wages can
explain unemployment uctuations.
Following Casares (2007b), labor contracts are set at a nominal wage that matches the
amounts of heterogeneous ex ante labor supply and labor demand, expected throughout
1In a state-of-the-art New Keynesian model, estimated for the US economy, Smets and Wouters (2007)
also nd a decline in total hours after a positive productivity shock.
2With the notable exception of recent papers that incorporate Mortensen-Pissarides search-and-
matching frictions in the labor market (e.g., Trigari, 2004; Christo¤el and Linzert, 2005; or Walsh, 2005),
which provide unemployment variations imported from the separation rate and the job creation-destruction
processes.
3Obviously, unemployment is not a brand new economic phenomenon. Quoting J. M. Keynes in chapter
18 of the General Theory: "the evidence indicates that full, or even approximately full, employment is of
rare and short-lived occurrence."
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the length of the contract.4 Then, unemployment arrives when there are a fraction of wage
contracts that cannot be renegotiated every period, allowing possible mismatches between
labor supply and labor demand. Such an interpretation of unemployment is inspired in
Milton Friedmans view of short-run unemployment variations, which hinges on the Wick-
sellian tradition. As described in Friedman (1968, pages 7-11), there can be a discrepancy
between the observed unemployment rate and the so-called "natural rate of unemploy-
ment" that would be reached in a Walrasian competitive labor market. This exible-wage
"natural rate of unemployment" can be set as a reference value in the labor market; an
actual rate of unemployment above the natural rate indicates that there is an excess sup-
ply of labor whereas a lower rate of unemployment corresponds to an excess demand for
labor. Abstracting from variations in the "natural rate of unemployment" (normalizing it
at zero), the model of this paper explains short-run uctuations of unemployment by the
gaps between labor supply and labor demand.5
Interestingly, the analytical expressions for uctuations on both price ination and wage
ination happen to be equivalent for our model with unemployment and the EHL model
without unemployment. Nevertheless, their slope coe¢ cients are di¤erent reecting the
particular labor market assumptions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the functioning of the
labor market with heterogeneous labor, sticky wages, and labor-clearing contracts. Section
3 discusses the connections and complementarities that arise between price setting and
labor-clearing wage setting with nominal rigidities à la Calvo (1983). Next, the aggregation
procedures provide the economy-wide price ination and wage ination equations that
are presented in Section 4 and then compared to others belonging to the New Keynesian
literature. As one applied exercise, Section 5 examines the responses to a technology shock
in the baseline model and other variants having either only sticky prices or only sticky
wages. The comparison is extended to the responses provided by the EHL model. Finally,
Section 6 concludes the paper with a review of the most relevant ndings.
4However, the relationship between price setting and wage setting di¤ers here from Casares (2007b)
where wage setting is subordinated to the case for optimal pricing at the rm level. Pricing and wage
setting are independent in this paper, i.e., the possibility for resetting a wage contract in one particular
industry is not linked to the pricing decision on that industry. This separation will result in a dynamic
behavior for the rates of price ination and wage ination clearly distinguishable from the patterns obtained
in Casares (2007b).
5The new branch of models that incorporate search and matching frictions á la Mortensen-Pissarides
(mentioned in footnote 2) provide theoretical justications for the existence of Friedmans "natural rate of
unemployment" and for its business cycle uctuations.
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2 Heterogeneous labor market with nominal rigidities
This section describes a labor market structure that provides unemployment uctuations
due to wage setting rigidities. To start with, let us characterize a labor market by the
following two main assumptions:
i) Heterogeneous labor. There is a continuum of di¤erentiated labor services; each rm
employs a specialized type of labor for the production of her di¤erentiated good whereas
the representative household supplies all the types of labor services.6
ii) Sticky wages. Wage contracts may not be reset every period and the nominal wage
remains unchanged if that is the case.7 Let us further develop this point.
Following Bénassy (1995), and more recently Casares (2007b), wage contracts are signed
when rms and households get together to agree on an industry-clearing nominal wage.8
Introducing wage stickiness á la Calvo (1983), the industry-clearing nominal wage, Wt(i),
is the one that satises
E
w
t
1P
j=0
jjw

ndt+j(i)  nst+j(i)

= 0; (1)
where the demand and supply of the i-type labor service are denoted by ndt+j(i) and n
s
t+j(i)
for period t + j, Ewt is the rational expectation operator conditional to the lack of wage
contract revisions,  is the rate of discount per period, and w is the Calvo constant
probability of not having a wage resetting. The sticky-wage formulation (1) di¤ers from
the one used in Casares (2007b) because the arrival of the market signal for wage setting
is independent now from the pricing decision of the rm. More obvious are the di¤erences
with the sticky-wage specication proposed by Erceg et al. (2000), where the nominal
wages are decided by heterogeneous households that bear market power to set their specic
optimal wage since each household is the unique supplier of one type of labor service.
According to (1), the industry-clearing nominal wage gives a perfect matching between
intertemporal labor demand and labor supply in the i-th industry that will employ the i-th
type of labor to produce the i-th type of good. Future values of labor demand or supply
in period t+ j enter the matching condition (1) with a relative weight that corresponds to
6Woodford (2003, chapter 3) uses this labor market scenario claiming that the existence of heterogeneous
labor services is more adequate for sticky-price models than the common assumption of homogeneous labor
market.
7Wage indexation on the steady-state rate of ination may also be considered without any e¤ect on
wage setting dynamics.
8Blanchard and Fischer (1989, pages 518-519), also present a model where "the nominal wage is set so
as to equalize expected labor demand and expected labor supply".
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their discounted probability of occurrence, jjw. A compromised value of Wt(i) resulting
from (1) can be obtained when inserting intertemporal labor demand curves ndt+j(i), de-
creasing on Wt(i); and intertemporal labor supply curves nst+j(i), increasing on Wt(i). In
a standard monopolistically competitive economy (Dixit and Stiglitz, 1977), labor demand
is the amount of work hours required to produce the level of output determined by the
demand curve at the rm-specic price. This can easily obtained when considering the
Dixit-Stiglitz demand curve and providing the rm with a production technology. The
supply of the specic i-type labor service is driven by the householdsoptimal allocation
between consumption and work hours.
A representative household maximizes intertemporal utility that depends positively on
Dixit-Stiglitz bundles of consumption goods and negatively on all di¤erentiated labor ser-
vices supplied at the rms (indexed over the unit interval). Specically, utility in period t
amounts to
Ut =
c1 t
1    
Z 1
0
nst(i)
1+
1 + 
di;
which conveys constant elasticities of both the consumption marginal utility, Uccc
Uc
=  , and
the marginal disutility of work hours,
Un(i)n(i)n(i)
Un(i)
= . With a standard budget constraint
(as in Casares, 2007b, for example), the supply of the i-th type of labor service is
nst(i) =

Wt(i)
Pt
c t
 1

; (2)
whereWt(i) is the nominal wage associated to type i of labor, and Pt is the aggregate price
level. Loglinearizing (2), it yields
bnst(i) = 1 (logWt(i)  logPt   bct) ; (3)
where variables topped with a hat denote (standard) log deviations from steady state, e.g.bnst(i) = log nst (i)ns(i). Thus, uctuations on the supply of labor i, bnst(i), depend positively on
the log of its specic nominal wage, logWt(i), at a (Frisch) labor supply elasticity given by
the inverse of the elasticity on disutility of hours, 1

. Aggregating over all the industries
builds up to this log deviations of total supply of labor
bnst = Z 1
0
bnst(i)di = 1 (logWt   logPt   bct) ; (4)
where logWt =
R 1
0
logWt(i)di is the log of the aggregate nominal wage. Subtracting (4)
from (3) results in this upward-sloped curve for the supply of labor i
bnst(i) = 1 (logWt(i)  logWt) + bnst : (5)
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Next, let us briey describe the behavior of rms and thus derive their labor demand
equation. Firms are Calvo-style price setters in a monopolistically competitive market, as
typically modelled within the New Keynesian framework. Therefore, with is a constant
probability, p, rms are not able to set the optimal price. The fraction of rms that are
allowed to charge the optimal price will determine it by maximizing intertemporal prot
conditional to situations of non-optimal price resetting for future periods and Dixit-Stiglitz
demand constrained. As shown in Casares (2007b) and elsewhere, optimal pricing requires
the following rst order condition (for the representative i-th rm)
Pt(i) =

   1
E
p
t
P1
j=0t;t+j
j
p t+j(i) (Pt+j)
 yt+j
E
p
t
P1
j=0t;t+j
j
p (Pt+j)
 1 yt+j
; (6)
where  is the Dixit-Stiglitz elasticity of substitution, E
p
t is the rational expectation op-
erator conditional to the lack of future price resetting, t;t+j is the stochastic discount
factor, and  t+j(i) is the real marginal cost of the i rm in period t + j. Ignoring capital
accumulation, rms have access to a production technology with decreasing labor returns
that, for the i-th rm, takes this expression
yt(i) =
 
exp(zt)n
d
t (i)
1 
, with 0 <  < 1, (7)
where yt(i) is the amount of output produced by rm i, and ndt (i) is its labor demand.
In addition, (7) includes the economy-wide AR(1) technology shock, zt = zt 1 + "t with
"t  N(0; "), as an stochastic source of variability. Using the standard Dixit-Stiglitz
demand curve
yt(i) =

Pt(i)
Pt
 
yt; (8)
the rm-specic production function (7) can be inserted in (8) and, after loglinearizing, the
following expression can be obtained for the dynamics of the demand for labor i9
bndt (i) =   1   (logPt(i)  logPt) + bnt: (9)
Firm-specic labor demand inversely depends upon the relative price and positively upon
the measure of demand-determined aggregate labor, bnt = R 10 bndt (i)di. Since prices change
with a same-sign reaction to marginal costs and the latter increase with nominal wages,
equation (9) provides industry-specic labor demand variations that are negatively related
to the relative nominal wage. Therefore, we can loglinearize the labor-clearing condition
9See Casares (2007b) for details.
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(1), and then use equations (5) and (9) for bndt+j(i) and bnst+j(i) in order to determine the
log of the labor-clearing wage, logW t (i). As shown in the Appendix,
10 it is obtained
logW t (i) = logWt    (1  w)Ewt
1P
j=0
jjw

ut+j +

1   (logPt+j(i)  logPt+j)

+ Et
1P
j=1
jjw
w
t+j; (10)
where
ut+j = bnst+j   bnt+j
is the rate of unemployment in period t + j dened by the log di¤erence between labor
supply and labor demand.11 This denition of unemployment has been recently used in
Blanchard and Galí (2007) or Casares (2007b), in a way of recuperating the Wicksellian
vision of business cycle unemployment due to labor gaps.12 As a result, there is a direct
link between unemployment and sticky wages. Unemployment uctuates because there
is a positive fraction, w, of total labor contracts that cannot be revised every period,
which, consequently, render some mismatches between industry-specic labor supply and
labor demand. When aggregating over all labor contracts, the endogenous measure of
unemployment is obtained as the log di¤erence between aggregate labor supply and the
(e¤ective) aggregate labor demand. Back to (10), the labor-clearing relative wage depends
negatively on terms such as the rate of unemployment and relative prices (both at current
and expected future values), and positively on the expected future rates of wage ination.
If the economy had no frictions on wage setting (w = 0:0), which would convey that all
the contracts are renegotiated every period, (10) would reduce to
logW t (i) = logWt  

1   (logPt(i)  logPt) ;
and the unemployment rate would always be at zero because all industries would have a
perfect match between labor supply and labor demand.13
10See steps leading to equation (A15) in Part 2 of the Appendix.
11A very similar way of dening the rate of unemployment is ut = 1  ntnst . Taking logs on both sides of
the equivalent expression 1 ut = ntnst , and then assuming that log(1 ut) '  ut because ut is a su¢ ciently
small number, leads to ut = bnst   bnt.
12As mentioned above in the introductory Section 1, our measure of unemployment explains cyclical
uctuations around a zero steady-state value. The inclusion of an extensive margin would provide a positive
unemployment rate in steady-state and long-run determinants of unemployment as in the Mortensen-
Pissarides literature.
13As discussed later in Section 4, the case with w = 0:0 represents an heterogeneous labor market
structure with fully-exible wages identical to the one described in Woodford (2003, chapter 3) for his
baseline New Keynesian model.
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3 Price-wage complementarities at industry level
The combination of an heterogeneous labor market with Calvo-style nominal rigidities on
both price and wage setting brings along a two-side connection between rm-specic prices
and rm-specic wages. On the one hand, optimal prices are set taking into account the
current rm-specic nominal wage since it a¤ects both current and future marginal costs.
The value of the nominal wage varies across rms due to the particular Calvo lotteries
that may have occurred in the past (a rm may have renegotiated the nominal wage for
the last time one period ago, or two periods ago, or three, etc.). On the other hand,
the nominal wage depends on the rm-specic price of the consumption goods produced
with labor employed via the labor demand schedule entering the matching condition (1).
Subsequently, we can guess that the relative optimal price and the relative labor-clearing
wage would evolve as indicated by these log-linear relationships
eP t (i) = eP t +  1fWt 1(i) (11a)fW t (i) = fW t    2 ePt(i); (11b)
where  1 and  2 are undetermined coe¢ cients to be found below. Several considerations
need to be made here. First, notation must be carefully explained. Thus, eP t (i) denotes the
relative optimal price as the log di¤erence between the optimal rm-specic price and the
aggregate price level, eP t (i) = logP t (i) logPt, whereas eP t is the average of those across all
industries, eP t = logP t   logPt with logP t = R 10 logP t (i)di. Similarly, the labor-clearing
relative wage is fW t (i) = logW t (i)  logWt, and its average value is fW t = logW t   logWt.
There should be noticed the di¤erence between the industry-specic optimal price, P t (i),
and the average of optimal prices across all the industries that receive the "adequate" Calvo
signal, P t . Their di¤erentiation is based on the distinctive nominal wage contracts that
they have in place. Secondly, the timing of setting prices and wages is not identical as
reected in (11a) and (11b). Prices are set before wages.14 Therefore, it is assumed that
when rms are allowed to set the optimal price they have not received the Calvo signal
for wage setting yet and they cannot know whether their wage contracts will be reset or
not in that period. They take the nominal wage from previous period as the reference
for the case of not having wage resetting in the current period (see 11a). Meanwhile,
the wage negotiation takes place (when possible) already incorporating the information on
14This assumption turned out to be necessary in order to derive a price ination equation with a term
involving expected next-period ination premultiplied by  as in the standard representation of the New
Keynesian Phillips curve. Therefore, it was taken for technical convenience.
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the current selling price; (11b) relates the relative nominal wage to its contemporaneous
relative price. Our last preliminary consideration is that the undetermined coe¢ cients  1
and  2 enter (11a)-(11b) with opposite signs. The relative nominal wage a¤ects positively
the relative price because of its increasing e¤ect on the real marginal costs faced by the
price-setting rm. By contrast, an increase in the relative price lowers the relative nominal
wage because labor demand falls at a higher price which pushes down the nominal wage
required for matching labor demand with labor supply.
For the labor market structure described above and borrowing the undetermined-coe¢ cients
technique used in Woodford (2005), one can obtain the following solution for the values of
 1 and  2
 1 =
(1  p)w
(1  pw)

1 + 
1  +  2

1  (1 p)w
1 pw
 ; and (12a)
 2 =
(1  w)
(1  )(1  wp)

1 + 1w
(1 )

1  p(1 w)
1 wp
 : (12b)
The proof is available in the technical Appendix. As shown by the analytical solution
(12a)-(12b), numerical values of  1 and  2 can be found by solving a non-linear pair of
equations when inserting the numbers assigned to the structural parameters , p, w, ,
, and . By looking at the solution pair (12a)-(12b), it can be observed that  1 and
 2 cannot be solved separately, which conrms the existence of interactions between price
setting and wage setting at industry level.
4 Aggregation. Price ination and wage ination
The dynamic equation for economy-wide price ination can be obtained from two log-linear
equations: the loglinearized aggregate price level denition and the loglinearized rst order
condition on the optimal price. Concerning the latter, equation (6) can be loglinearized as
follows
logP t (i) =
 
1  p

E
p
t
1P
j=0
jjp
b t+j(i) + logPt+j ;
which, using other relationships involved in the model, can be transformed in a expression
that depends exclusively on aggregate variables15
eP t = 1 p
1+

1 +2

1  (1 p)w
1 pw
Et 1P
j=0
jjp
b t+j + Et 1P
j=1
jjp
p
t+j; (13)
15See Part 1 of the technical Appendix for the details on the derivation.
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where eP t is the average relative price dened above, b t+j is the log of the aggregate
real marginal cost in t + j, and pt+j = logPt+j   logPt+j 1 denotes price ination in
t + j. The second equation required to determine price ination dynamics is the one
reached when combining the log-linearized aggregate price level denition from Calvo-style
price stickiness, logPt = p logPt 1 + (1   p) logP t , with the price ination denition,
pt = logPt   logPt 1. It leads to eP t = p1 ppt : (14)
Now, (14) can be substituted in the left-hand side of (13) to yield
pt =
(1 p)(1 p)
p

1+

1 +2

1  (1 p)w
1 pw
Et 1P
j=0
jjp
b t+j + 1 pp Et 1P
j=1
jjp
p
t+j:
Using the last expression one period ahead to compute pEt
p
t+1 and then subtracting it
from current price ination gives this result
pt   pEtpt+1 = (
1 p)(1 p)
p

1+

1 +2

1  (1 p)w
1 pw
b t + 1 pp pEtpt+1;
where putting together the terms on expected ination becomes
pt = Et
p
t+1 +
(1 p)(1 p)
p

1+ 
1 +2

1  w(1 p)
1 pw
b t: (15)
Interestingly, the analytical expression (15) governing the dynamics of price ination co-
incides with the standard representation of the so-called New Keynesian Phillips Curve
(NKPC) derived with either fully-exible competitive wages or with sticky wages set by
households.16 Price ination is forward-looking and changes in response to uctuations on
current and expected future real marginal costs. Even though the general expression is
not altered, the slope coe¢ cient in (15) is a¤ected by the presence of nominal rigidities on
labor-clearing contracts because it depends on the value of the sticky-wage probability, w.
Therefore, our proposal for a sticky-wage specication with labor-clearing contracts keeps
the standard NKPC expression with a di¤erent slope coe¢ cient, reecting the existence of
price-wage complementarities discussed above.
Now, let us derive the equation that governs the dynamic behavior of aggregate wage
ination. Like for the case of price ination, two log-linear relations implied by the model
are required: one obtained by log-linearizing the intertemporal labor-matching condition
16See Yun (1996) for a NKPC with exible wages and homogeneous labor, Woodford (2003, chapter 3)
for the NKPC with exible wages and heterogeneous labor, and Erceg et al. (2000) for the NKPC with
sticky wages set by households.
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(1), and the other one that describes the aggregation of nominal wages. As shown in Section
2, the log of the nominal wage consistent with (1) is given by equation (10), which after
some algebra leads to17
fW t =   (1 w)
1+
1w
(1 )

1  p(1 w)
1 wp
Et 1P
j=0
jjwut+j + Et
1P
j=1
jjw
w
t+j; (16)
where fW t is the average relative wage dened above, and wt+j = logWt+j   logWt+j 1 is
the rate of wage ination in t + j. Loglinearizing the denition of the aggregate nominal
wage with Calvo staggered wages results in a log of the aggregate nominal wage obtained
as a weighted average of its previous observation and the average value of current labor-
matching contracts, i.e., logWt = w logWt 1 + (1   w) logW t , where using the wage
ination denition for period t, it is obtained
fW t = w1 wwt : (17)
Combining (16) and (17), it yields
wt =   (1 w)(1 w)
w

1+
1w
(1 )

1  (1 w)p
1 pw
Et 1P
j=0
jjwut+j +
1 w
w
Et
1P
j=1
jjw
w
t+j:
Analogously to the procedure used above for price ination, we can rewrite the last expres-
sion in period t+ 1 and then compute wt   wEtwt+1 to nd
wt   wEtwt+1 =   (1 w)(1 w)
w

1+
1w
(1 )

1  (1 w)p
1 pw
ut + 1 ww wEtwt+1;
which collapses to the wage ination equation
wt = Et
w
t+1   (1 w)(1 w)
w

1+1
w
(1 )

1  p(1 w)
1 pw
ut: (18)
Notably, wage dynamics are forward-looking and inversely driven by the rate of unemploy-
ment, ut = bnst  bnt. The rst aspect (forward-lookingness) is typical from a New Keynesian
model and the second aspect (negative relationship between nominal wage changes and
unemployment) belongs to the Old Keynesian tradition that relates money wages to em-
ployment developments (Keynes, 1936, chapter 19; Modigliani, 1947). Actually, (18) is a
forward-looking representation of the empirical relationship between nominal wage ination
and unemployment estimated by Phillips (1958) and microfounded by Lipsey (1960) and
Phelps (1968). The slope coe¢ cient attached to unemployment in (18) is determined by
17The steps and algebra involved are included in Part 2 of the technical Appendix.
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parameters related to the wage setting procedure (w, ) as well as other related to price
setting (p,  1, ). The latter is another example of the connections between price setting
and wage setting, embedded in the model setup discussed above.
One comparison with the sticky-price, sticky-wage model by Erceg et al.(2000)
The common practice for a sticky-wage specication in the New Keynesian framework
is to let households decide on the nominal wage contract as rst assumed by EHL (2000).18
Their labor market structure also incorporates heterogeneous types of labor services, al-
though each of them is supplied by one di¤erentiated household and demanded by all rms.
Thus, there are household-specic nominal wages that become staggered as subject to the
arrival of the right probability à la Calvo (1983). Each household may be able to set the
nominal wage whereas the amount of work hours supplied is given by the labor-demand
constraint. Firms demand bundles of labor obtained using a Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator that
combines all types of labor services, which allows substitutions between di¤erentiated labor
services with a constant elasticity. The EHL model is a general equilibrium model where
the labor market clears in every period because all industries present a perfect match
between labor supply and labor demand. For a separable utility function introduced in
Section 2, the EHL model explains uctuations of wage ination as given by the following
forward-looking equation
wt = Et
w
t+1 +
(1 w)(1 w)
w(1+f )
(dmrst   bwt) ; (19)
where dmrst   bwt is the log di¤erence between the aggregate marginal rate of consump-
tion/hours substitution and the real wage, and f is the rmslabor demand elasticity of
substitution. Recalling the specication of the utility function introduced above and using
the equilibrium condition bct = byt, we have
dmrst   bwt = bnt + byt   bwt: (20)
Meanwhile, total supply of labor (4) and the denition of the log the real wage, bwt = cWt  bPt,
can be inserted in the equation that determines the rate of unemployment of our model to
yield
ut = bnst   bnt = 1 ( bwt   byt)  bnt: (21)
18Other recent papers with household-specic sticky wages are Amato and Laubach (2003), Smets and
Wouters (2003, 2007), Christiano et al. (2005), and Casares (2007a).
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Noteworthily, there is a semi-loglinear relationship between the rate of unemployment used
in our model, equation (21), and the gap that drives wage ination uctuations in the EHL
model, dmrst   bwt, dened in (20).19 Comparing them, it is straightforward to see that
dmrst   bwt =  ut; (22)
which obviously is only a valid statement for our model with endogenous unemployment
because in the EHL model the unemployment rate is always at zero. The last result allows
us to rewrite the wage ination equation (18) as follows
wt = Et
w
t+1 +
(1 w)(1 w)
w

1+1
w
(1 )

1  p(1 w)
1 pw
 (dmrst   bwt) ; (23)
whose analytical form is identical to the wage ination equation derived in EHL (2000).
Hence, the dynamic behavior of wage ination is governed by an equation equivalent to that
of the EHL model, with the only di¤erence in the numerical value of the slope coe¢ cient.20
Moreover, the price ination equation of the EHL model has also the same forward-
looking expression that we obtained above as the NKPC of our model (see equation 15).
The slope coe¢ cient that gives the real marginal cost semi-elasticity is
(1 p)(1 p)
p(1+ 1 )
in EHL
(2000) with happens to be higher than the number taken from equation (15) of our model.
Therefore, the comparison of our sticky-wage model with EHL (2000) shows that both
models share the same analytical (forward-looking) expressions for dynamic changes on
price ination and wage ination, although the slope coe¢ cients on those expressions are
built up di¤erently from the respective structural parameters.21
Two limit cases
The model presented in this paper provides a general structure for both sticky prices
and sticky wages, ranging from perfectly exible prices (or wages) to completely rigid
prices (or wages). In other words, our setup with two di¤erent Calvo probabilities allows
particular specications that can be of interest as limiting the sources of nominal rigidities
exclusively on either price or wage setting. Hence, there are two limit cases that deserve
special attention:
19This point has already been shown in Casares (2007b).
20By contrast, Casares (2007b) shows that when sticky wages are subordinated to rm-specic sticky
pricing, the wage ination equation includes another term involving the gap between labor productivity
and the real wage.
21Nevertheless, these structural parameters could be calibrated in a particular way that yield a perfect
matching on the slope coe¢ cients of both models, which would make them equivalent from a business cycle
perspective.
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i) the case for sticky prices (p > 0:0) and fully-exible wages (w = 0:0).
ii) the case for sticky wages (w > 0:0) and fully-exible prices (p = 0:0).
In the rst specication, the model collapses to the baseline New Keynesian setup
introduced by Woodford (2003, chapter 3). All industries have labor clearing in the sense
that the nominal wage is adjusted to match the labor demand of the rm with the labor
supply of the household. In turn, the unemployment rate is always maintained at zero.
Nominal (and real) wages are distinctive across industries because pricing and labor demand
is rm specic (driven by Calvo lotteries). After aggregation, the log of the real wage
coincides with the log of householdsmarginal rate of substitution as required to guarantee
the absence of unemployment.22 The slope coe¢ cient in the wage ination equation (18)
or the equivalent (23)soars to innity as w approaches to zero, in practice implying a
zero unemployment or a zero gap between the marginal rate of substitution and the real
wage. In the price ination equation (15), the slope coe¢ cient of the real marginal cost
simplies to
(1 p)(1 p)
p(1+
(+)
1  )
when w = 0:0, which coincides with that derived in the baseline
model of Woodford (2003, chapter 3).
The second notable specication is the one with exible prices and sticky wages, ob-
tained when setting p = 0:0 in our model. Firms can optimize on their prices all the
periods. They will decide a di¤erent optimal price depending on the specic nominal wage
that they face given the Calvo lotteries on wage setting. As typical from a exible-price
scenario, the aggregate real marginal cost is constant as all rms keep a constant mark up
of prices over marginal costs.23 Therefore, the log of the aggregate real wage is equal to the
log deviation of the aggregate marginal product of labor. The expression for a New Key-
nesian Phillips curve (equation 15) is no longer applicable since its slope coe¢ cient jumps
to innity as p approaches zero. Instead, we can just make uctuations on the real wage
equal to those in the aggregate labor productivity, in order to pin down a constant real
22This result can be obtained from the labor supply curve of the model (equation 4) when considering
that total labor supply is equal to total labor demand (zero unemployment).
23The optimality condition on the price (equation 6) with no rigidities becomes Pt(i) =  1Pt t(i), that
can be loglinearized to logPt(i) = logPt + b t(i). Aggregating over the industries forming the economy, it
yields Z 1
0
logPt(i)di = logPt +
Z 1
0
b t(i)di,
where using
R 1
0
logPt(i)di = logPt, we obtain zero uctuations on the aggregate real marginal costZ 1
0
b t(i)di = b t = 0.
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marginal cost, b t = 0:0, that becomes the equation that explains price ination dynamics.
Wage ination dynamics are still provided by equation (18), or equation (23), since wage
rigidities give rise to the presence of unemployment in the labor market and also existing
gaps between the marginal rate of substitution and the real wage. However, exible prices
reduce the slope coe¢ cient on wage ination dynamics. Thus, the slope in (23) gets down
to (1 w)(1 w)
w(1+1
w
(1 ) )
.
As a summary, Table 1 collects the slope coe¢ cients for price and wage ination dy-
namics at various levels of price-wage rigidities, using expression (23) for wage dynamics
to make it comparable to the one obtained in the EHL model.
5 Nominal rigidities and technology shocks
This section examines the responses to a positive innovation in technology under di¤erent
price/wage settings and also compares the e¤ects to those obtained in the EHL model. Let
us recall that a technology shock enters the rms production function as assumed in (7).
Taking logs in (7) and aggregating across rms yield
byt = (1  ) bnt + (1  ) zt; (24)
that relates output uctuations to those of total labor employed and to the realization of
the AR(1) technology shock.
The model has to be completed with the demand sector, and also a numerical calibration
for its structural parameters needs to be provided. Regarding the former, the forward-
looking IS curve explains output uctuations in response to the real interest rate
byt = Etbyt+1   1

(Rt   Etpt+1), (25)
which is consistent with the optimizing behavior of the representative household depicted
above (shown in Casares, 2007b). The second required equation for the demand sector is a
monetary policy rule. On a standard fashion, it is assumed that the nominal interest rate
is set as indicated by the following Taylor (1993)-type rule with an smoothing component
Rt = RRt 1 + (1  R)
h
pEt
p
t+1 + y
byt   byti ; (26)
with p > 1:0, y  0:0, 0:0 < R < 1:0. The output gap term, byt   byt, denes log
deviations between current and potential output, being the latter the amount of output
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produced if the economy would be released from nominal rigidities. Setting p = w = 0:0,
it can be found  
+
1  + 
byt = (1 + )zt: (27)
Hence, the complete model consists of the price ination equation (15), the wage ination
equation (18), the endogenous unemployment denition given in (21), the production tech-
nology (24), the IS curve (25), the Taylor rule (26) where potential output is given by (27),
and the following denitions for log deviations of the the real marginal cost and the real
wage
b t = bwt   (byt   bnt) ; (28)bwt = bwt 1 + wt   pt : (29)
In total, there are nine equations that may give solution paths for the following nine en-
dogenous variables wt , 
p
t , ut, byt, bnt, Rt, byt, b t, and bwt. Alternatively, wage ination
dynamics can be expressed by (23) and the model can be solved when adding one extra
equation for uctuations of the marginal rate of substitution (equation 20).
For a quarterly calibration of the structural parameters, the intertemporal discount
factor is set at  = 0:99 which implies a 1% quarterly real rate of interest in steady state,
4% in annualized terms. The production technology is set with decreasing marginal returns
at  = 0:36, and the coe¢ cient of serial correlation on the technology shock is equal to
0.95. Householdsutility function comes with the same elasticities  =  = 2:0. The value
assigned to  implies a low Frisch elasticity of labor supply,  1 = 0:5, consistent with most
micro evidence.24 With respect to nominal rigidities, it is assumed that prices and wages
are reset one time per year on average as suggested by Taylor (1999) and also used in EHL
(2000). Accordingly, the Calvo probabilities are set at p = w = 0:75. The Dixit-Stiglitz
elasticity of demand is  = 6:0 in order to have a 20% mark-up of prices over marginal
costs in steady state. Finally, the coe¢ cients of the monetary policy rule (26) are the ones
originally advocated by Taylor (1993), p = 1:5 and y =
0:5
4
, with a signicant degree of
interest-rate smoothing, R = 0:8.
For the calibration of the EHL model, all the parameters take the same values as the
ones set in our model, with the additional parameter for the labor demand elasticity set at
f = 4:0 as in EHL (2000).
Now we are ready to examine the responses of the model to a 1% expansionary tech-
nology shock entering (24). Figure 1 shows a graphical display with the impulse-response
24The empirical evidence supports values for the Frisch labor supply elasticity ranging between 0 and
0.5 (see Pencavel, 1986; Altonji, 1986, and Domeij and Flodén, 2006).
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functions and Table 2 provides the numerical values of the peak responses relative to those
of output. Both Figure 1 and Table 2 compare results obtained in our model with sticky
prices and sticky wages (p = w = 0:75), with only sticky prices (p = 0:75 and w = 0:0)
and with only sticky wages (p = 0:0 and w = 0:75). Furthermore, the reactions observed
are compared with the ones obtained in the EHL model that features sticky prices set by
rms (p = 0:75) and sticky wages set by households (w = 0:75).
The reaction of output is very similar in three of the four cases displayed in Figure 1.
Thus, the three variants with sticky prices give a moderate output response at the quarter
of the shock, which is yet slightly further increased for the next few quarters and then
slowly returns to the steady-state level. The model with exible prices is the only case
where output separates from this hump-shaped pattern. Output has an immediate sharper
response (about twice the size observed in the other cases) with no delayed peak. The
deeper reductions in nominal and real interest rates (not reported in Figure 1) explain, via
the IS curve, why output rises more with no pricing frictions.
As shown in Figure 1, price ination also reports similar drops for all the cases except
for the model with exible prices. When all prices can optimally reset, the fall of price
ination relative to the change in output is several times greater than the ones observed with
price stickiness (see Table 2). This result is easily understandable as price stickiness makes
75% of prices remain unchanged. Comparing between sticky-wage models, the response
of ination to the technology shock is of larger magnitude in the EHL model than in our
baseline model as also documented in Table 2. The reason for the di¤erence is that the
slope coe¢ cient governing the reaction of price ination to the real marginal cost is higher
in the EHL model compared to our model (see Table 1).
Wage ination responds to the technology shock with a minor drop (less than one sixth
of the output percent change) except in the case when wage contracts are fully exible
(w = 0:0) that shows a downwards reaction even larger in size than the percent increase
observed in output (see Table 2).
The response of the real wage is the result of combining the reactions of wage ination
and price ination. Therefore, such real wage responses are very helpful to understand the
implications of the presence or absence of price/wage rigidities. The model with exible
prices (p = 0:0) requires that the real wage and productivity move along together because
the real marginal cost never uctuates (due to the constant mark-up in monopolistic com-
petition). In turn, the real wage immediately responds to the shock in order to replicate
the labor productivity peak and its gradual return to steady state. By contrast, the model
with sticky prices and exible wages (equivalent to the model used by Woodford, 2003,
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chapter 3) requires that the real wage uctuates in the same way as the householdsmar-
ginal rate of substitution. Under our selected calibration of parameters, the marginal rate
of substitution falls and so equally does the real wage under fully-exible nominal wages.25
A countercyclical real wage in the presence of technology shocks is not supported by the
empirical evidence (e.g., Francis and Ramey, 2005). Finally, both our baseline model with
sticky prices and sticky wages and the EHL model show a procyclical and gradual real wage
response with a late peak reached approximately ten quarters after the shock. As this paper
shows, both models have identical expressions for price and wage ination dynamics with
di¤erent slope coe¢ cients that may explain the quantitative di¤erence in the reaction to
the technology shock. In both settings, the real wage changes as a combined reaction to
changes in productivity (that a¤ects price ination) and to changes in the marginal rate of
substitution (that a¤ects wage ination).
Total hours fall markedly after the technology shock in all the cases with sticky prices.
This is a typical nding on the New Keynesian framework that is supported by a signicant
portion of the empirical evidence.26 The model with exible prices shows an initial positive
reaction of hours followed by a severe decline that ends up converging towards the other
cases.
Finally, the impact of a technology shock on the rate of unemployment also provides
insightful di¤erences across the model variants at hand. Our baseline model with sticky
prices and sticky wages suggests that the rate of unemployment temporarily would rise
with the productivity shock because labor demand (i.e., total hours) falls further below the
drop of labor supply. If frictions on wage contracts are lifted (w = 0:0), the model reports
no reaction in unemployment because total labor demand and labor supply perfectly match
at the current wage rate. As discussed above, the EHL model also delivers no response on
the unemployment rate in spite of featuring sticky wages.27 Lastly, the case with exible
prices and sticky wages brings a reduction in the unemployment rate because labor demand
barely changes and the fall of labor supply dominates.
25If the labor elasticity in the utility function were set at a lower value (for example  = 1:0), the marginal
rate of substitution and the real wage would both respond with increases to the technology shock. However,
that calibration would imply a Frisch elasticity higher than the numbers provided by the microeconomic
empirical evidence.
26See Galí (1999) and, more recently, Francis and Ramey (2005) and Smets and Wouters (2007).
27The sticky-wage EHL model is built upon the assumption that all pairs of di¤erentiated labor demand
and labor supplied are well matched at their current nominal wage rates. Even though there are no labor
gaps, the aggregation delivers gaps between the real wage and the e¤ective marginal rate of substitution.
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6 Conclusions
This paper presents a model that features two sources of nominal rigidities: Calvo-style
sticky prices for monopolistically competitive rms and Calvo-style sticky wages on hetero-
geneous labor contracts. Wage contracts are jointly agreed by households and rms because
they are set at the nominal wage that matches labor supply with labor demand. Conse-
quently, the existence of wage rigidities is crucial to explain the presence of endogenous
unemployment in the model. after doing the aggregation algebra, the dynamic uctuations
on the rate of wage ination depend negatively on the rate of unemployment which recalls
the relationship found in the old empirical Phillips (1959) curve, and also on next periods
expected wage ination.
Comparing the model described in this paper with the popular sticky-price sticky-wage
model by Erceg et al. (2000), we found that price ination and wage ination dynamics
are governed by the same analytical expressions. However, the slope coe¢ cients on those
expressions are di¤erent, reecting the disparities in the labor market structures of these
two models. In addition, the unemployment rate is absent in the model by Erceg et al.
(2000) and present in the model shown here.
Finally, the responses to a technology shock were analyzed under di¤erent levels of
nominal rigidities. In the baseline variant with both sticky prices and sticky wages, output
increases describing a hump-shaped pattern, price ination and wage ination slightly fall,
the real wage shows a slow procyclical reaction and the unemployment rate temporarily
rises. When wages turn fully exible (as in the baseline New Keynesian model described in
Woodford, 2003), output and ination react similarly but the real wage responds with an
countercyclical fall and there is no unemployment. If prices are exible and wages remain
sticky, price ination falls much more sharply, output and the real wage increase more than
with sticky prices, and the unemployment rate drops.
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Technical Appendix. How to nd the analytical solution for the undetermined coef-
cients,  1 and  2, and how to obtain the loglinear expressions used for the average values
of the relative price, eP t , and the relative wage, fW t , set in period t.
Part 1. Finding the solution for the undetermined coe¢ cient  1 and the analytical
expression for the average relative prices set in period t, eP t .
Loglinearizing (6), the (log-linear) optimality condition on the price setting decision of
the i-th rm with Calvo-type stickiness is
logP t (i) =
 
1  p

E
p
t
1P
j=0
jjp
b t+j(i) + logPt+j : (A1)
Using logPt+j = logPt +
Pj
k=1 
p
t+k in (A1), it is obtained
eP t (i) = logP t (i)  logPt =  1  pEpt 1P
j=0
jjp
b t+j(i) + Et 1P
j=1
jjp
p
t+j: (A2)
The real marginal cost is the ratio between the real wage and labor productivity. Thus,
rm-specic real marginal costs are inuenced by both the rms nominal wage (a¤ecting
real wage) and the selling price (a¤ecting labor productivity via output demand). In formal
terms
E
p
t
b t+j(i) = Ept logWt+j(i)  Et logPt+j   Ept dmplt+j(i) =
E
p
t logWt+j(i)  Et logPt+j +

1  E
p
t byt+j(i); (A3)
where dmplt+j(i) =   1 byt+j(i) is the log of the marginal product of labor given the
decreasing-marginal returns production technology introduced in the main text. The Dixit-
Stiglitz log-linear demand curve with no optimal price adjustment since period t links the
log of rm-specic output, byt+j(i), with the relative price
E
p
t byt+j(i) =   (logP t (i)  Et logPt+j) + Etbyt+j;
which, using logPt+j = logPt +
Pj
k=1 
p
t+k, implies
E
p
t byt+j(i) =  
 eP t   jX
k=1
Et
p
t+k
!
+ Etbyt+j: (A4)
Inserting (A4) onto (A3), it is obtained
E
p
t
b t+j(i) = Ept logWt+j(i)  Et logPt+j   1  
 eP t   jX
k=1
Et
p
t+k
!
  Etdmplt+j,
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with dmplt+j denoting the log of the aggregate marginal product of labor. Summing and
subtracting logWt+j, i.e. the log of the aggregate nominal wage in t + j, and dening the
log of the real marginal cost as b t+j = logWt+j  logPt+j dmplt+j, we can easily transform
the last expression into the following one
E
p
t
b t+j(i) = Etb t+j + Ept fWt+j(i)  1  
 eP t   jX
k=1
Et
p
t+k
!
; (A5)
where fWt+j(i) = logWt+j(i)  logWt+j is the relative nominal wage in t+ j. Next, (A5) is
plugged into the rst order condition (A2) and terms are rearranged to yield
1 +

1  
 eP t (i) =  1  pEpt 1P
j=0
jjp
b t+j +fWt+j(i)+1 + 1  

Et
1P
j=1
jjp
p
t+j:
(A6)
To be consistent with the value of the undetermined coe¢ cient  1 implied by the linear
relationship guessed in (11a), we must nd some expression for E
p
t
P1
j=0 
jjp
fWt+j(i) de-
pending upon the observed value of fWt 1(i). The Calvo scheme applied for wage setting
in period t results in
fWt(i) = w fWt 1(i)  wt + (1  w)fW t (i);
where fW t (i) = logW t (i)   logWt is the optimal relative wage that may be set by the
i-th rm in period t. Using the proposed conjecture (11b) conditional to optimal pricing
in period t allows us to write fW t (i) depending upon the average (relative) value of new
contracts and also upon the relative optimal price: fW t (i) = fW t    2 eP t (i), which can be
inserted in the previous expression to reach
fWt(i) = w fWt 1(i)  wt + (1  w)fW t    2 eP t (i) : (A7)
Recalling fW t = w1 wwt from equation (17) of the text, and canceling terms in (A7), we
have fWt(i) = wfWt 1(i)   2 (1  w) eP t (i): (A8)
Repeating the procedure one period ahead for E
p
t
fWt+1(i), replacing fWt(i) for its value
obtained in (A8), and using (11b) conditional to the lack of optimal price setting in t+ 1,
E
p
t
fW t+1(i) = EtfW t+1    2  eP t (i)  Etpt+1 ; result in
E
p
t
fWt+1(i) = 2wfWt 1(i)   2  1  2w eP t (i) +  2 (1  w)Etpt+1: (A9)
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A generalization of (A8) and (A9) for a t+ j period gives the following expression
E
p
t
fWt+j(i) = j+1w fWt 1(i)   2  1  j+1w  eP t (i) +  2Et jP
k=1
 
1  j k+1w

pt+k: (A10)
Using (A10), the stream of conditional relative wages becomes
E
p
t
1P
j=0
jjp
fWt+j(i) = w
1  wp
fWt 1(i)   2 1
1  p
  w
1  wp
 eP t (i)
+  2

1
1  p
  w
1  wp

Et
1P
j=1
jjp
p
t+j: (A11)
Substituting (A11) in (A6) yields 
1 +

1   +  2
 
1 
 
1  p

w
1  wp
!! eP t (i) =  1  p w1  wp fWt 1(i)+ 1  pEt
1P
j=0
jjp
b t+j
+
 
1 +

1   +  2
 
1 
 
1  p

w
1  wp
!!
Et
1P
j=1
jjp
p
t+j;
which conrms the validity of the guess (11a), eP t (i) = eP t +  1fWt 1(i), with the following
implied value for the undetermined coe¢ cient
 1 =
 
1  p

w 
1  wp

1 + 
1  +  2

1  (1 p)w
1 wp
 ; (A12)
and the following expression to determine the average relative price set in period t
eP t = 1  p
1 + 
1  +  2

1  (1 p)w
1 wp
Et 1P
j=0
jjp
b t+j + Et 1P
j=1
jjp
p
t+j: (A13)
In the text, (A12) corresponds to equation (12a) and (A13) to equation (13).
Part 2. Finding the solution for the undetermined coe¢ cient  2 and the analytical
expression for the average relative wages set in period t, fW t .
The wage setting behavior described in the text can be used to identify the second
undetermined coe¢ cient,  2, as well as the average relative wage, fW t . If the contract on
the i-th labor service is negotiated in period t; the (log of) the labor-matching nominal
wage is the one that satises
E
w
t
1P
j=0
jjw
 bndt+j(i)  bnst+j(i) = 0;
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where, as discussed in the text, the log of labor demand is a decreasing function of the
relative price bndt+j(i) =   1  ePt+j(i) + bnt+j and the log of labor supply increases with the
relative wage bnst+j(i) = 1fWt+j(i)+bnst+j which are inserted in the clearing condition to reach
E
w
t
1P
j=0
jjw

  
1  
ePt+j(i) + bnt+j   1

fWt+j(i)  bnst+j = 0: (A14)
The unemployment denition, ut+j = bnst+j   bnt+j, and the value of the relative wage
conditional to the absence of contract adjustments, fWt+j(i) = fW t (i) Pjk=1 wt+k, can also
be inserted in (A14) to obtain
fW t (i) =   (1  w)Ewt 1P
j=0
jjw

ut+j +

1  
ePt+j(i)+ Et 1P
j=1
jjw
w
t+j; (A15)
that shows a negative impact of relative prices on relative wages, equation (10) of the
main text. Our next task is to express the stream of relative prices, Ewt
P1
j=0 
jjw
ePt+j(i),
depending upon the current value of the relative price in order to have an expression forfW t (i) consistent with (11b). Beginning with ePt+1(i), the Calvo aggregation scheme implies
E
w
t
ePt+1(i) = p  ePt(i)  Etpt+1+  1  pEwt eP t+1(i); (A16)
where the second term is Ewt eP t+1(i) = Et eP t+1 +  1fW t (i) using (11a) in t + 1 conditional
to having a new wage contract set in t. Making such replacement in (A16), it yields
E
w
t
ePt+1(i) = p  ePt(i)  Etpt+1+  1  p Et eP t+1 +  1fW t (i) : (A17)
Taking equation (14) from the text in period t+1 says eP t+1 = p1 ppt+1, which can be used
to simplify (A17) to
E
w
t
ePt+1(i) = p ePt(i) +  1  1  pfW t (i): (A18)
Similarly to (A16), the value of Ewt ePt+2(i) in the stream of relative prices is a Calvo-type
linear combination of non-adjusted prices and optimal prices
E
w
t
ePt+2(i) = p Ewt ePt+1(i)  Etpt+2+  1  pEwt eP t+2(i);
where using (A18) for the rst term leads to
E
w
t
ePt+2(i) = p p ePt(i) +  1  1  pfW t (i)  Etpt+2+  1  pEwt eP t+2(i): (A19)
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Recalling (11a) in period t + 2 conditional to the lack of wage resetting for substitu-
tion in the second term of (A19), Ewt eP t+2(i) = Et eP t+2 +  1Ewt fW t+1(i) = Et eP t+2 +
 1
fW t (i)  Etwt+1, it is obtained
E
w
t
ePt+2(i) = p p ePt(i) +  1  1  pfW t (i)  Etpt+2+ 1  p Et eP t+2 +  1 fW t (i)  Etwt+1 ;
where inserting eP t+2 = p1 ppt+2 simplies to
E
w
t
ePt+2(i) = 2p ePt(i) +  1  1  2pfW t (i) +  1  1  pEtwt+1: (A20)
A generalization of (A18) and (A20) results in the following rule
E
w
t
ePt+j(i) = jp ePt(i) +  1  1  jpfW t (i) +  1Et j 1P
k=1
 
1  j kp

wt+k;
that serves to compute the stream of relative prices as follows
E
w
t
1P
j=0
jjw ePt+j(i) = 11  wp ePt(i) +  1

w
1  w
  wp
1  wp
fW t (i)
   1

w
1  w
  wp
1  wp

Et
1P
j=1
jjw
w
t+k: (A21)
Substituting (A21) in the relative wage equation (A15), it is obtained
1 +
 1w
(1  )

1  p (1  w)
1  wp
fW t (i) =    (1  w)(1  )  1  wp ePt(i)
   (1  w)Et
1P
j=0
jjwut+j +

1 +
 1w
(1  )

1  p (1  w)
1  wp

Et
1P
j=1
jjw
w
t+j;
(A22)
which proves right the proposed guess (11b) with the following implied value for the unde-
termined coe¢ cient  2
 2 =
(1  w)
(1  )(1  wp)

1 + 1w
(1 )

1  p(1 w)
1 wp
 ; (A23)
and the following expression for the average relative wage contract set in period t
fW t =   (1 w)
1+
1w
(1 )

1  p(1 w)
1 wp
Et 1P
j=0
jjwut+j + Et
1P
j=1
jjw
w
t+j: (A24)
In the text, (A23) corresponds to equation (12b) and (A24) to equation (16).
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Table 1. Analytical slope coe¢ cients under alternative price/wage settings
Price ination, eq (15) Wage ination, eq (23)
Sticky prices, sticky wages
(1 p)(1 p)
p

1+ 
1 +2

1  w(1 p)
1 pw
 (1 w)(1 w)
w

1+1
w
(1 )

1  p(1 w)
1 pw

Sticky prices, exible wages
(1 p)(1 p)
p(1+ 1 +

1 )
1, since bwt = dmrst or ut = 0:0
(Woodford, 2003)
Flexible prices, sticky wages 1, since b t = 0 (1 w)(1 w)w(1+1 w(1 ) )
EHL (2000) model
(1 p)(1 p)
p

1+

1 
 (1 w)(1 w)
w(1+f )
Table 2. (Peak) responses to a technology shock relative to output.
p=by w=by bw=by bn=by u=by
Sticky prices, sticky wages -0.20 -0.16 0.62 -1.41 0.53
(p = w = 0:75)
Sticky prices, exible wages (Woodford, 2003) -0.15 -1.71 -1.57 -1.72 0.0
(p = 0:75 and w = 0:0)
Flexible prices, sticky wages -1.00 -0.09 0.97 -0.54 -0.54
(p = 0:0 and w = 0:75)
EHL (2000) model -0.26 -0.08 0.78 -1.24 0.0
(p = w = 0:75)
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Figure 1: Responses to a 1% technology shock.
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